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Gothic Line Campaign, 91st
Inf. Division, September 1944
“...a lifetime of ... fear,
courage and prayers.”
DURING THE MONTH of September
the 91st Division fought its most brilliant campaign,
in which it smashed the most formidable defensive positions
in Italy, the Gothic Line. It advanced through elaborately
constructed fortifications over mountainous terrain
made hazardous by rain and fog, with unflinching determination
and unwearying courage. According to one infantryman
the climactic days, 12-22 September, were a "lifetime
of mud, rain, sweat, strain, fear, courage, and prayers.”
But with brilliant leadership and magnificent courage,
the 91st Division cracked the Gothic Line and established
itself as one of the great fighting Divisions of World
War II.
Contrary to expectation
the German high command did not elect to make a stand
at the Arno but withdrew to their prepared positions
north of the Sieve River. According to Intelligence
reports the Division was facing four Divisions, estimated
to number 12,600 men, with at least one Division of
2100 men held in reserve in the vicinity of Prato. The
first extended stand was anticipated at a line running
from Fontebuona, through Ferraglia, Bivigliano, and
M. Senario to Il Poggiolo.
The Division moved across
the Arno with the utmost secrecy on 6 September, and
assembled on the north bank, screened by the British
Eighth Indian Division. While the British were screening
the Division's movements, however, they found that
the enemy had begun to withdraw. The Eighth Indian Division,
under the operational control of the 91st Division,
sent out patrols constantly, in an effort to maintain
contact with the withdrawing enemy. On 8 September,
when patrols reached Farraglia, Bivigliano, M. Senario,
and M. Calvana and found the positions unoccupied, the
British units moved forward to occupy the line.
Moving Up
The
91st Division moved into position during the night of
9 September. The 362nd Infantry relieved the 2nd Brigade
of the 1st British Division
near Vaglia and the 363rd Infantry, moving through the
3rd Brigade, closed just south of Bivigliano. The Division
Artillery took positions in the vicinity of Pratolino,
and by 1945 all pieces were registered.
Two members of the Fifth
Army meet over a cup of tea
Jump Off
The attack jumped
off according to plan at 100530. Advancing steadily
northward, the infantrymen met no resistance. In the
afternoon, when the 2nd Battalion of the 363rd Infantry
cut Highway 65, near Tagliaferra, they received artillery
fire, and from then on both Regiments were subjected
to harassing artillery and small arms fire from enemy
positions north of the Sieve River. During the night,
despite the extensive minefields along the banks and
stream bed of the river, troops of both Regiments
waded the river and took up secure positions on the
north bank. Thus the first Division objective had
been secured.
The next morning, 11 September, the two Regiments
continued the attack. Since the Germans had withdrawn
from their outpost line upon contact, there was little
resistance. Only the mountainous terrain and enemy
minefields slowed the advance. At the end of the day
the 362nd Infantry was just north of Gagliano, while
the 363rd Infantry had occupied San Agata. The next
morning the attack continued against steadily increasing
resistance. The 363rd Infantry advancing toward Monticelli,
and the 362nd moving on M. Calvi met small arms and
mortar fire as well as harassing artillery fire. The
main obstacle, however, was the mountainous terrain
which grew steadily more difficult as the troops advanced
toward the ridge line of the Apennines.
Gothic Line Campaign of
363 Inf September 1944
In the afternoon, 13 September,
General Livesay, ordered the 361st Infantry committed.
The Regiment was to pass through forward elements of
the 363rd Infantry on the left and to attack at 140600
in the center of the Division sector. On the right,
the 363rd was ordered to secure Monticelli; on the left
the 362nd was ordered to secure M. Calvi and then proceed
to its next objectives, M. Poggio all Ombrellino and
M. Gazzaro. Thus until the 363rd reverted to reserve,
the 91st Division was to have nine Battalions on line:
three on the left, one moving north near Highway 65,
and two attacking M. Calvi; three in the center attacking
Hills 844 and 856; and three on the right attacking
Monticelli. The great drive on the main defenses of
the Gothic Line was now begun.
Unlocking
the Door: Monticelli
Monticelli,
the objective of the 363rd Infantry, was one of the
most important positions in the Gothic Line. Overlooking
Il Giogo Pass, it was the left bastion of the heavily
fortified Il Giogo defense area and constituted the
anchor for the rest of the Gothic Line in the Division
sector. It is a rocky, broken ridge, with a cone-shaped
peak 3,000 feet high, wooded three-fourths of the way
up, but devoid of any cover and concealment for the
last 600 feet of the slope. On its sides pillboxes and
dugouts had been built in such a way as to afford mutual
protection for each other. These had been camouflaged
very carefully so that they were invisible to the naked
eye. A characteristic pillbox, large enough to accomodate
five men, was of concrete construction with a roof covered
with three feet of logs and dirt. In the front was a
slit six inches high and three feet long.
Monticelli Ridge - Gothic
Line Position
As further
protection row after row of barbed wire, one foot high
and 25 feet deep, had been placed at 100 yard intervals
up to the top of the mountain. In two ravines which
led to the top of the mountain the enemy had laid minefields.
On the reverse slope of Monticelli elaborate dugouts
had been constructed. These had been dug straight back
into the mountain to a distance of seventy-five feet
and were large enough to accomodate twenty men. On a
hill 300 yards north of Monticelli a huge dugout was
found which had been blasted out of solid rock. Shaped
like a U and equipped with cooking and sleeping quarters,
it was large enough to accommodate 50 men.
Typical German Dugout in
Gothic Line
The Advance
Was Slow...
On 13 September the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 363rd Infantry
began the slow torturous attack. Each pillbox had to
be knocked out individually by artillery or by flanking
assaults by the infantry with hand grenades. Frequently
minefields or wire obstacles had to be breached before
the pillbox itself could be reduced. It was slow, bloody,
costly fighting. In the afternoon the 2nd Battalion
attacked between the 1st and 3rd Battalions and pushed
under cover of a smoke screen to within 600 yards of
the crest of Monticelli. The next morning, however,
they were subjected to a heavy counterattack and driven
from their positions.
After two days of slow progress
the first break in the enemy defenses developed. Company
B overran the enemy Main Line of Resistance and occupied
the ridge line extending west from the peak Of Monticelli.
Although the Company was subjected to counterattack
after counterattack and unrelenting artillery and mortar
concentrations, the flank was never turned. After one
counterattack two enemy were found sleeping in Company
B foxholes!
The Final
Assault
The
next day while the 1st Battalion held the left flank
and the 2nd Battalion maneuvered to reduce pillboxes
that had held up its advance, the 3rd Battalion launched
an attack on the peak. Despite every effort the intense
mortar and machine gun fire stopped the attack, and
it finally bogged down. On the morning of 17 September
General Livesay, on the ground, laid the plans and personally
supervised the preparations for the final assault. Every
resource was marshaled for the effort. With every Battalion
exerting maximum pressure on the enemy, the 2nd Battalion,
with Company K, made an all-out assault on the peak.
A view from the summit of
Giogo Pass, Monticelli on the right
By 1330 Company K had advanced
over a mile and had come to within 300 yards of the
crest. At 1400 a rolling barrage in which 272 rounds
of 105 mm were fired by the 347th Field Artillery in
25 minutes moved up the south- western slope of the
mountain with the infantrymen following as close as
50 yards behind it. At 1448 word was received that the
company commander of Company K, Captain William B. Fulton,
his radio operator, and six enlisted men had reached
the top of Monticelli.
"The Situation
Is Well In Hand"
Immediately
the enemy laid an intense artillery and mortar concentration
on the position and began to organize a counterattack
of 200 to 300 men at a point 400 yards to the north.
The company commander directed artillery fire on the
area, and 46 rounds were fired in 45 minutes to break
up the attack before it could get under way. Meanwhile
the small band was reinforced, and at 172240 Col. Magill
reported that "the situation is well in hand." During
the night two Batteries of the 347th Field Artillery
laid a ring of steel around Monticelli firing 4,000
rounds, a volley every three minutes. There was no counterattack;
by morning, 18 September, Monticelli was occupied in
strength.
A machine gun crew fires
against the Germans dug in on Monticelli
Monticelli
had been won by the courage and sacrifice of the 363rd
Infantry and the superb support of the 347th Field Artillery
and its associated units. The artillery pounded constantly
at enemy positions. In one area where artillery fire
had been directed for four days, 150 dead were later
counted. One of the targets fired during the all-night
barrage, 17-18 September proved to be a Battalion Command
Post 30 feet wide dug 100 yards into the side of the
mountain. The next day 33 prisoners were taken from
the cave, dazed and shaken by the pounding they had
received. The artillery had run the enemy into their
holes, and the infantry had dug them out, and Monticelli
fell.
General Keyes, Commanding
General, II Corps, expressed his pride in the capture
of the key position, the first break in the Gothic Line
in the II Corps sector, when he telegraphed to General
Livesay:
"Congratulations upon the capture
of Monticelli. The successful accomplishment of this
tough assignment is fitting tribute to the dogged determination
and courage of the 91st."
Desiring to exploit the
capture of Monticelli as rapidly as possible, General
Keyes ordered that the 363rd Infantry push on to the
Santerno River immediately. Patrols were sent out the
afternoon of 18 September and 190530 the 3rd Battalion
attacked in force. Around Casanova the enemy put up
a stubborn resistance to protect their withdrawal. During
the night 20-21 September the enemy withdrew across
the Santerno in this sector and the 2nd Battalion, which
had relieved the 3rd Battalion, advanced rapidly. They
organized the area up to the river and send strong patrols
across the river to maintain contact with the enemy.
Men of the 363rd Infantry
advance toward a shell burst, passing
a dead German in the road
The Unnamed Hills
The 361st Infantry, in the center of the Divisional
sector, on the left of the 363rd Infantry, attacked
north from Montepoli at 140545. The sector assigned
to the 361st is a bowl, surrounded on three sides by
a mountain range shaped roughly like a horseshoe. At
the right point lies Monticelli; at the left point lies
M. Calvi. The floor of the bowl is not flat, but is
cut by a ridge running north and south which rises to
Hills 844 and 856. The enemy literally looked down
the Regiment's throat whichever way it turned, and from
their prepared positions the enemy was able to place
terrific machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire upon
the infantrymen advancing northward.
There was a second difficulty
which hampered, to a certain extent, all the Regiments
of the Division, but especially the 361st Infantry.
This was the problem of supply. On the left and right,
roads were available at least part of the way for the
transportation of supplies, but in the 361st Infantry
sector the only road of any size running north from
San Agata stops at Casal. By ceaseless effort the Engineers
rapidly extended a trail to Coppo adequate for quarter
ton trucks which ran from Casal to Vallappero.
This was unquestionably one of the most difficult assignments
the Engineers completed during the month. The trail
was so rocky that it was impossible to scrape the road
out of the mountainside and so steep on the outside
that it was equally impossible to bank it up to a passable
width. Yet by blasting and chipping the rock wall and
base, Company A using all three of its platoons in succession
working night and day succeeded in widening the trail
into a road passable to peeps.
It was dangerous, especially
in the dark when the drivers could not even see the
tracing tape and had to be led along the road by a convoy
officer, but it was usable up to Coppo. From Coppo there
were only mule trains. For days every drop of medicine
and every round of ammunition and every bit of food
was carried forward from Coppo on mules. The trail was
so narrow and dangerous that it was necessary to set
up traffic control points along the way so that the
litter bearers bringing out the wounded could pass the
mule trains bringing up supplies.
Gothic Line Campaign of
361 Inf., September 1944
There
were, however, excellent reasons for attacking at this
point. Within the Division sector it was possible to
attack here or at Futa Pass. Futa was the most heavily
defended position in the Gothic Line and had the further
advantage of being very easily supplied down Highway
65. The section of the Gothic Line in the sector against
which the 361st attacked, although very heavily fortified,
was not prepared in depth and was very difficult to
supply.
When the 361st Infantry broke through the Main Line
of Resistance in their sector, they found that the enemy
failed to solve their supply problem. Most of the prisoners
captured had had no food for three to four days and
their ammunition supply was very low. Thus, although
the sector presented great difficulties for the Regiment
in the attack, it presented equal difficulties for the
defense. The wisdom of the commitment of the Regiment
in this sector was borne out by the subsequent success
of its drive.
"They Are
Looking Down Our Throats"
At
140545 the 361st Regiment jumped off and was almost
immediately subjected to fire from every side, especially
from Pgio Roncolombello, Apparita, and M. Calvi, under
attack by the 362nd Infantry. Despite this, good gains
were made until the main enemy lines were reached late
in the afternoon. It was clear from the first day's
fighting that extensive use of mortars and machine guns
would be necessary if any marked advances were to be
made, and when General Livesay visited the Regimental
Command Post late in the day, he ordered Col. Broedlow,
to "Fire all the ammunition you can haul."
The next three days the
advance was slowed by barbed wire entanglements, pillboxes,
dug in positions, and heavy fire of all sorts. At one
point the 3rd Battalion reported that in front of it
were "2 banks of wire, each 15-20 feet deep with a space
of 20 feet between each, which was undoubtedly heavily
mined." Even 105mm artillery shells could not breach
the obstacle. This could only be done by hand, always
in the face of terrific fire from well-prepared positions.
On one occasion an Engineer was disarming mines while
the infantrymen protected him by keeping the pillbox
ahead “buttoned up.” As the Engineer, prone on the ground,
squirmed from mine to mine, an infantryman called to
him to keep his head down. When he protested that his
forehead was already touching the ground, the infantryman
ordered him to turn his head over to the side so that
he could maintain his protective fire!
After three days of bitter
fighting, pillbox after pillbox had been captured, minefield
after minefield had been breached, and barbed wire entanglements
had been blown up by artillery shelling and bangalore
torpedoes. Savage, bloody counterattacks had been beaten
off, and the constant pounding began to tell on the
enemy. The same development was observed along the entire
Division front. Terrific artillery and mortar concentrations
and the constant drive of the infantry had taken their
toll.
Replacements for the enemy were brought up as early
as 13 September, but they were adequate neither
in numbers or in combat training. Further, putting these
replacements in the line was no small task. One prisoner
reported that his group had been attacked by American
bombers on the way to the line and had suffered heavy
casualties. "Many men lost their weapons on the march
to the MLR because they were too exhausted to carry
them."
By 19 September the disorganization
mounted; captives flowed through the prisoner of war
cage. Of the 896 prisoners taken between 9 September
and 30 September, 502 were captured in the four
day period, 18-21 September. Although much hard fighting
lay ahead, the enemy had begun to crack under the strain,
and the tempo of advance picked up.
In the sector of the 361st
Infantry this was especially true. By 180650 Companies
A and G were reported on Hill 856 and at
180811, Company E was reported on Hill
844. The capture of Hill 844 was
especially important, for it had been the most strongly
fortified and most stubbornly defended hill facing the
Regiment. Its loss unhinged the enemy positions in the
sector and forced the Germans to retreat. Early in the
afternoon as the Regiment pressed forward, the disorganization
of the enemy became more and more apparent, as they
took hasty positions for a brief stand and then ran
back to others. Before the day was over Hill 805 had
been taken.
"Objective
Taken"
The next day the attack continued under a tremendous
rolling barrage. In rapid succession Hills 992, 1022
and l027 fell. Since the 363rd Infantry had secured
the Division right flank, the 361st Infantry swept northwest
along the ridge line of the Apennines. Resistance was
light as the enemy fled, but the terrain was extremely
broken and was made more difficult by rain.
The 3rd Battalion occupied the high ground overlooking
the Santerno and sent patrols to Castro San Martino:
the 1st Battalion occupied positions from Segalari east
to Hill 705, with Company B immediately east of the
road junction at Futa Pass covering it with machine
guns. Thus the Regiment stabilized its lines overlooking
the Santerno River.
Futa Pass
While the 363rd Infantry was battling for Monticelli
on the left and the 361st Infantry fought for Hill
844 and 856, the 362nd Infantry was advancing up Highway
65 toward M. Calvi and Futa Pass. As in the other
two sectors, the fighting was very bitter and the
advance painfully slow, 13-15 September.
A mountain top blasted by
91st Division Artillery
Capture of Futa Pass by
362 Inf supported by 346 FA Bn, September 1944
With unwearying courage the Regiment fought its
way from pillbox to pillbox, through barbed wire and
minefields, always through areas in which the enemy
had excellent observation and prepared fields of fire.
On 14 September the 2nd Battalion occupied M. Calvi
but could not exploit its position because of the terrific
mortar concentrations which fell from Hills 821 and
840. Nor could the Battalion advance rapidly to Hill
840, for although the forward slope of M. Calvi is a
gentle incline, the reverse slope drops abruptly to
the foot of Hill 840, at some points as much as 500
feet in 200 yards. Not only was it almost impossible
terrain for the infantry to cross, but artillery fire
is masked in many areas. Thus even high angle fire was
unable to reach the mole-like Germans dug in below.
Rolling Barrage
Shortly
after noon 15 September the 1st Battalion attacked north
to Morcoiano according to a plan which involved nine
TOT's being delivered by the massed artillery in 15
minutes. Progress of this attack was slow but steady.
Morcoiano was heavily defended, but on 18 September
the town fell and the Battalion pressed on. The next
morning under a "nearly perfect" rolling barrage fired
by the 346th Field Artillery the assault" on Poggio
began. The artillery fire did not smash the fortifications,
but it forced the defenders to seek cover and "button
up" completely. Then when the fire moved past a given
point, before the enemy could jump out of holes to man
their weapons, the infantry, just a scant 300 yards
behind the barrage, was upon them. Two hundred prisoners
were taken. In this way the attack literally walked
through a strong point that would ordinarily have been
a scene of bloody and prolonged fighting.
A mortar crew fires another
round against the Gothic Line
Litter bearers evacuate
a casualty from the front lines
On the same day, 19 September,
the 2nd Battalion, attacking from the southeast, captured
both Hill 821 and Hill 840. Advancing rapidly to keep
contact with the enemy, now driven from his Main Line
of Resistance, the Battalion occupied M. Alto during
the night of 19-20 September.
Although the collapse of
the enemy lines in the 362nd sector was not so spectacular
as it was in the 361st sector, Hill 896 was captured
the next day, and by the morning of 21 September Company
A had reached the Santerno and had set up machine guns
trained on Futa Pass.
In the meantime the 3rd Battalion, 362nd
Infantry, which had been operating almost alone, with
the closest unit more than 1000 yards away, was battling
north along Highway 65. Despite a warning by General
Livesay that it was not to try "to win the war by
itself" it was trying to do exactly that. On the morning
of 16 September the Battalion had come against a spectacular
Anti-tank ditch over a mile long over hill and valley
and covered by interlocking fields of machine gun
fire. Covering the highway was an 88mm Tiger tank
gun and turret mounted in a concrete emplacement,
as well as other concrete pillboxes and dugouts commanding
the approaches to the Pass.
For two consecutive days
the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, directed
the 346th Field Artillery in a steady pounding of San
Lucia. The Tiger tank gun was knocked out and two 105mm
SP guns were destroyed. Every time the enemy attempted
to move, the artillery hit him. On 20 September
under a rolling barrage the Battalion attacked along
the ridges, surprised the enemy, overran his positions,
and captured Hill 689. The next day in a pincers movement
they seized San Lucia and, under artillery fire which
was seldom more than 300 yards ahead of the front-line
troops, they took Hill 901. That night they outposted
in Futa Pass in preparation for the final all-out assault
against Hill 952, which commanded the vaunted Futa Pass
defense system.
One of many concrete pillboxes
in the Futa Pass area
"The Pass
is Taken"
The
next day, 21 September, the Battalion inched its way
relentlessly up the hill against every type of fire
the enemy could pour on it. Yet by nightfall it outposted
positions on the summit. This was the culmination of
the Division's 12 day battle to crack the Gothic Line.
With the fall of Futa Pass, the door which had been
unlocked at Monticelli and swung open by the drives
of the 363rd and 361st Infantries literally fell off
its hinge. The Gothic Line had been smashed.
"A Fighting
Team"
In
twelve days the 91st Division had broken a series of
defenses the German Todt organization had worked over
a year to build. Pillboxes, concrete emplacements, some
so thick 105mm shells bounced off them like peas shot
from a pea shooter, barbed wire, tank guns mounted in
concrete turrets, minefields, and ditches, this had
been the Gothic Line. Acres of timber land had been
cut over to make unbroken fields of fire. Finally, all
these fortifications had been constructed in the rocky
broken Apennine mountains, which in themselves constituted
a formidable barrier. Manning these fortifications was
the 4th Paratroop Division, one of Hitler's best Divisions
in Italy.
In cracking the Gothic Line
the Division had fought as a team. Each separate branch
of the Army contributed nobly to the accomplishment
of the Division's task.
A member of Co. 'I', 362nd
Infantry marches three captured
paratroopers back to the PW cage
Defenses in Depth, Futa
Position
The 316th Medical Battalion, its equipment and staff
strained by handling thousands of casualties did magnificent
work. Litter bearers carried patients over narrow slippery
mountain paths, through minefields and barbed wire entanglements
and over stream beds. Yet without thought for themselves,
the medical men worked to treat the wounded and to evacuate
them from the battlefields.
For the 316th Engineer Battalion
the drive from the Sieve River to the Santerno River
was a continuous nightmare. The road net in the Division
sector was poor, and damaged by shelling, demolitions,
and rain, what roads there were became almost useless.
They built roads where no roads were meant to go; they
filled or by-passed giant craters; they built bridges
and rebuilt them when rain- swollen streams washed them
away. By their untiring efforts ammunition, medical
supplies and food reached the front-line troops.
Much of the credit for breaching
the Gothic Line goes to the Division Artillery, composed
of the 916, 346, 347, and 348 Field Artillery
Battalions, augmented by the power of II Corps
artillery. For preparations fired during the campaign
the Division controlled 168 guns. During
the period from 11 September to 22 September,
inclusive, 94,379 rounds were fired, and during a single
twenty-four hour period, 15 September,
14,321 rounds were fired. Again and again
prisoners were captured, dazed and stunned by the artillery
barrage to which they had been subjected.
Brig. Gen. Ralph Hospital,
Division Artillery Commander
The
heavy artillery fire held the enemy helpless in their
emplacements, unable to ward off death or capture by
infantrymen with grenades and automatic weapons who
swiftly followed up the concentrations. The extensive
use of rolling barrages, especially by the 362nd Infantry,
is a noteworthy application of this technique of advance
and an indication of its success in the campaign.
The 91st Division was a
single, coordinated fighting unit. It was the Division
which captured Monticelli and M. Calvi, and fought bitterly
for Hills 840 and 844. It was the Division that advanced
through rain and fog over steep and rocky terrain along
the ridge line of the Apennines to the Santerno River.
It was the whole Division which refused to be a holding
force but swept northward along Highway 65 and captured
Futa Pass.
Great credit is due to the mule pack groups who went
where motors could not go; to the 791st Ordnance Company,
the 91st Quartermaster Company, the 91st Signal Company,
the 91st Reconnaissance Troop, who never faltered and
refused to conceive of failure. Each man in the Division
had acted as if he had “wanted to win the war all by
himself,” and the tales of heroism and gallantry are
legion. In twelve days it had reduced to nothing a year's
work of thousands of impressed laborers and had decimated
the best troops Hitler could put into the line against
it.
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